Supply privilege abuse and restrictive transfers

A mint or restriction can materially change user capabilities, but neither code presence nor one failed transfer independently proves malicious use across every wallet.

Separate reachable capability, observed invocation, state effect and attributed intent. A function named mint is not enough: inspect its implementation, authorization and any alternative path. An observed privileged mint needs exact token identity, event/state reconciliation, block and amount. A cap slogan may be limited by upgrades or alternate roles. A restriction function may have legitimate stated purposes, but its actual effects must be tested at a defined state.

For selective transfers, name sender class, recipient, route, amount, block and execution method. A passing privileged sender does not prove ordinary users can exit; a failing ordinary scenario does not prove universal failure. Reverts can arise from balance, allowance, route, deadline, state or policy. Economic output loss also differs from nominal fees. Keep competing explanations and unresolved dependencies visible.

This fixture uses paper execution rows, not live simulations or transactions. Radar context is named by the curriculum but produces no real output here. Report each technical change within the stipulated scope and decline human/intent attribution without independent evidence.

Capability: reachable privileged behavior.

Invocation: recorded use of that behavior.

Selective restriction: different outcomes under stated sender/route conditions.

Test scope: exact state and parameters for an execution observation.

ILLUSTRATIVE at block B: role M stipulated mint adds 200 to supply 1000, producing 1200. At B+1, ordinary sender W fails a 10-unit transfer on route R with reason POLICY; privileged sender P passes the same stated amount/route. Balances and allowances are stipulated sufficient. Implementation and broader route coverage are absent.

Contract-permissions matrix with M mint and W/P transfer rows, exact paper parameters and outcomes. Add untested-route/amount gaps rather than a universal honeypot badge.

Caption: Fictional privileged change and selective outcomes; no universal exit or intent conclusion.

SPECIFICATION_ONLY — the rendered visual has not been produced or independently reviewed.

Within the fiction, the supply arithmetic increases by 20%, and two sender scenarios have different policy outcomes. Those are bounded paper observations.

No actual mint, code deployment, universal transfer failure, harmful intent, controller identity or independent Radar result is established. One route and amount do not cover every exit path.

Calling code presence an observed invocation; assuming privileged success proves public exit; generalizing one route to all transfers; treating a restriction as automatic fraud.

Calculate supply change, write a scenario table and classify “everyone can exit,” “nobody can transfer,” and “policy differs by sender.” Name two missing tests.

• Separate capability, invocation and effect.
• Reconcile supply using compatible raw units.
• Bound sender/amount/route/state.
• Retain alternate explanations and unknown intent.

Observed privileged effects and bounded execution differences need specific records and must not become universal or criminal claims.

• A reachable function is not proof of its use.
• Privileged success does not establish ordinary-user exit.
• One tested scenario cannot settle all execution paths.

P13-L05

Use the named ZECOIN tool only as an evidence-reading context. This lesson creates no tool output, account session or entitlement. Offline exercise; do not sign, deploy, approve or fund anything.

• ERC20: ERC-20 standard — Token interface and allowance semantics; the standard does not establish issuer identity or safe permissions. Boundary: Mechanism documentation only; original illustrative values are stipulated, not observations. Historical records have separately frozen provenance and explicit collection gaps.
• PROXY: ERC-1967 proxy storage slots — Standardized implementation/admin slots; renouncing one role does not establish all upgrade paths disabled. Boundary: Mechanism documentation only; original illustrative values are stipulated, not observations. Historical records have separately frozen provenance and explicit collection gaps.

ILLUSTRATIVE — entirely fictional offline inputs; no current observation.

null — no real observation

1

null

needs_review