Security workflow rehearsal

EN source master · P03-L08 · needs_review

Offline/read-only study only. Never provide secrets, passwords or authentication codes. No wallet connection, real approval, live revocation, transaction signature, transfer, funds or trade. Visuals are specifications only.

A checklist is useful when it changes the decision on a specific request. This assessment combines exact source, authority scope, evidence stage and safe reporting in a new offline case.

Define the intended task first

The user intent in this assessment is viewing a public balance. A good submission identifies that purpose before reading the page's urgency or suggested workflow. Nothing in the stated purpose requires secret entry or authorization. The exercise supplies summaries only, with invalid SIM identifiers and reserved .invalid origins.

Inspect origin and distribution

R1 is the independently stipulated reference. R2's complete hostname differs. That difference does not identify a human operator, but it prevents treating the prompt as a reference-authenticated request. R3's package-version label has no integrity record, so the distribution conclusion remains UNKNOWN. Do not visit either card or run software to find out.

Inspect capability and context

R4 is a permit-shaped request despite its balance-view caption. Structured signing semantics and application handling must be read from the actual fields [TYPED]. The fixture supplies token/owner/spender/amount but omits verifying-contract and nonce context. You can identify the requested spend scope without inventing the missing fields.

R5 reports one existing zero allowance at an earlier stipulated context. ERC-20 allowance is a scoped state [ERC20], not a guarantee that any new request is safe. R6's hardware-review badge also supplies no decoded effects or real device evidence. The response should not use either as permission to bypass missing provenance or scope.

Make a decision without an accusation

A defensible offline decision is STOP: unresolved source, authority beyond intent and missing scope context. This is a decision about whether the learner has enough evidence to continue the rehearsal, not proof of theft or a named attacker. A real authorization is neither needed nor permitted to demonstrate the decision.

Build the report and score it

OBSERVED: fixture hostnames, request summary and selected allowance card. INFERRED: source mismatch and capability/purpose mismatch. UNKNOWN: verifying contract, nonce, software integrity, execution and human identity. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE: guaranteed safety or confirmed loss. Security guidance supports avoiding secret requests and unofficial support interactions [SECURITY]; no confidential data belongs in the submission.

Score five dimensions: exact source/object; scope/stage; provenance; uncertainty; safe decision. A submission that invents execution or includes confidential values requires remediation regardless of numeric score. This formative exercise does not issue a certificate, verify real security competence or personalize financial action.

• Intent: task the user actually wants.
• Decision record: conclusion tied to supplied evidence.
• Coverage gap: required context absent from records.
• Critical evidence error: fabrication or unsupported attribution invalidating reasoning.

ILLUSTRATIVE unseen offline case. Intent=view public balance. R1 reference https://safe.example.invalid. R2 prompt https://safe.example.invalid.assist.invalid. R3 package APP-Q v3, integrity absent. R4 caption view balance; permit-shaped TOKEN-Q/OWNER-Q/SPENDER-Q/value 900 whole fixture units, verifying contract/nonce UNKNOWN. R5 earlier selected TOKEN-Q allowance 0 at SIM-H5. R6 hardware-review badge only. No signature/receipt/secret or current device record.

Evidence panel with six source cards feeding exact-source, requested-scope, missing-context and decision columns. Final card STOP—insufficient context to proceed, not ‘confirmed theft’. Provide a five-dimension rubric with textual equivalents for mobile/RTL.

Specified source/scope gaps and a defensible offline stop decision.

Actual signing, loss, malicious identity, overall safety, real hardware status or certification eligibility.

• Zero allowance used to bless a new request.
• Badge treated as decoded device evidence.
• Inventing missing contract/nonce.
• Continuing because a countdown or logo says to.

Submit a six-row evidence matrix, a requested/signed/executed stage table and a 100-word maximum decision note. Include all four evidence states, two precise nonsecret follow-ups and the five-dimension score. Do not interact with the domains or supply any confidential data.

Submit a table and bounded conclusion using only supplied offline material. Editorial time allocation: study 12 min, exercise 8 min, correction/quiz 10 min.

• State intent.
• Compare full origin.
• Read authority fields.
• Record stage/context gaps.
• Make a justified offline decision.
• Request records, never secrets.

A complete security rehearsal links exact-source checks, capability inspection, provenance and uncertainty to a safe offline decision. Completing it does not verify actual asset safety or issue a certificate.

• Apply a read-only pre-signing checklist to a simulated request
• Apply the preceding checks to a new sanitized case.
• Write a scored decision with missing facts and no live authorization.

P04-L01 after prerequisite and correction review.

NONE in authoritative catalog. Provided offline data suffice; no product purchase or wallet operation required.

• [TYPED] EIP-712 typed structured signing — Structured signing/domain fields; application replay protections remain separate.
• [ERC20] ERC-20 token standard — approve, allowance and transferFrom for compliant interfaces.
• [SECURITY] Ethereum security and scam prevention — Secret confidentiality, exact-domain checks and unofficial support caution.

Documentation explains mechanisms. Historical records retain their declared source class. Source inspection is not independent editorial acceptance.