P03-L04 · P03 · P03-M01
Inspect spender amount and revocation limits
Prerequisites: P03-L03
Learning objectives
- Inspect spender amount and revocation limits
- Read complete allowance tuples and contexts.
- Bound one zero state without claiming all authorizations reset.
EN source master · P03-L04 · needs_review
Offline/read-only study only. Never provide secrets, passwords or authentication codes. No wallet connection, real approval, live revocation, transaction signature, transfer, funds or trade. Visuals are specifications only.
Why this matters
Permissions are asset/spender/context-specific. A zero allowance can support a useful finding while other tokens and signed authorizations remain unresolved.
Explanation
Name the complete tuple
ERC-20 describes allowance, approve and transferFrom semantics [ERC20]. A permission row needs network, token, owner, spender and observation context. A different token is a different permission even when the displayed spender is identical.
Read state rather than session labels
R1/R3 show the same tuple at two stipulated contexts. R2 shows a UI disconnect; it does not describe a token-contract state change. A requested revoke, submitted action and resulting state would be separate evidence stages. R3 is provided offline; the learner must not send a live revocation.
R4 concerns TOKEN-B and cannot be merged into TOKEN-A's row. Reporting only the reassuring zero while omitting the other row would lose material scope. Preserve both values and explain which question each answers.
Keep signed authorizations unresolved where needed
A permit has separate signature/nonce/deadline semantics under the applicable contract rules [PERMIT]. R5 deliberately omits its relationship to the current nonce/consumption state. One zero allowance does not establish that every outstanding signature is invalidated. The required follow-up is the applicable rules and relevant state, not another live classroom transaction.
An allowance state also does not reverse a prior transfer or establish that an owner never exposed recovery material. Permission inventory and signing-capability exposure are distinct research questions.
State narrow results
OBSERVED: fixture values and session status. INFERRED: selected-tuple change from 100 to zero. UNKNOWN: complete permission inventory and R5 viability. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE: “all assets are safe.” A bounded conclusion names the selected tuple at H12 and leaves the separate rows unresolved.
Key terms
- Allowance: scoped permission value.
- Spender: applicable authorization role.
- Revocation evidence: resulting permission state at context.
- Coverage: permission rows actually supplied.
Historical example
ILLUSTRATIVE cards. R1 SIM-N/TOKEN-A/OWNER-X/SPENDER-Y at SIM-H10 allowance 100 whole fixture units. R2 UI disconnected at T1. R3 same tuple H12 allowance 0. R4 TOKEN-B/same owner/spender H12 allowance 80. R5 TOKEN-A permit summary with current nonce/consumption relationship UNKNOWN. No real approval, signature or transaction.
Visual specifications
Tuple/context matrix. R1→R3 is a selected comparison; R4 stays 80, R5 unknown. Put R2 in a session row with no automatic onchain-state edge.
What the evidence proves
Selected fixture states and scoped comparison.
What the evidence does not prove
Live revocation, complete permission reset, invalidation of all permits, reversal of loss or guaranteed safety.
Common mistakes
- Disconnect called revoke.
- One zero generalized to every token.
- Zero state assumed to cancel every signature.
Practical exercise
Build R1/R3/R4 permission rows. Explain R2 and R5's limits. Rewrite ‘disconnect and zero makes every asset safe.’
Submit a table and bounded conclusion using only supplied offline material. Editorial time allocation: study 12 min, exercise 8 min, correction/quiz 10 min.
Show worked correction
TOKEN-A selected tuple is 100 at H10 and zero at H12. TOKEN-B remains 80. R2 proves UI disconnect only. R5 viability UNKNOWN pending rules/state. Broad safety INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. Report exact scope and missing coverage without live operations.
Rubric: exact scope, source provenance, reasoning, explicit limits and safe offline handling, one point each. Invented observations or unsupported identity attribution require correction regardless of score. Formative only.
Checklist
- Complete tuple/context.
- Session and state separated.
- Requests and outcomes separated.
- Different tokens kept distinct.
- Outstanding-signature gaps named.
Summary
A permission finding is contextual. Disconnection and one zero allowance do not establish comprehensive authorization reset or asset safety.
Summary
- Inspect spender amount and revocation limits
- Read complete allowance tuples and contexts.
- Bound one zero state without claiming all authorizations reset.
Next lesson
P03-L05 after prerequisite and correction review.
Tools
NONE in authoritative catalog. Provided offline data suffice; no product purchase or wallet operation required.
Sources & claim boundaries
- [ERC20] ERC-20 token standard — approve, allowance and transferFrom for compliant interfaces.
- [PERMIT] ERC-2612 signed approvals — Permit allowance authorization with owner, spender, value, nonce and deadline.
Documentation explains mechanisms. Historical records retain their declared source class. Source inspection is not independent editorial acceptance.
Visual specifications
P03-L04-V01
Inspect spender amount and revocation limits
ILLUSTRATIVE sanitized offline cards, not a live screen
Tuple/context matrix. R1→R3 is a selected comparison; R4 stays 80, R5 unknown. Put R2 in a session row with no automatic onchain-state edge.
Tuple/context matrix. R1→R3 is a selected comparison; R4 stays 80, R5 unknown. Put R2 in a session row with no automatic onchain-state edge.
390px stacked cards/text equivalent; 768px/desktop render acceptance pending
RTL prose; identifiers isolated LTR; factual edge directions preserved
FIX-P03-L04
Sources & claim boundaries
ERC20 · PRIMARY_DOCUMENTATION
ERC-20 token standard
- Supported claim
- approve, allowance and transferFrom for compliant interfaces.
- Verification boundary
- Primary source inspected for associated mechanism or attributed statement; no authentication of illustrative data.
- Checked at
- 2026-10-01
https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20
PERMIT · PRIMARY_DOCUMENTATION
ERC-2612 signed approvals
- Supported claim
- Permit allowance authorization with owner, spender, value, nonce and deadline.
- Verification boundary
- Primary source inspected for associated mechanism or attributed statement; no authentication of illustrative data.
- Checked at
- 2026-10-01
https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2612
Dataset provenance
id: FIX-P03-L04
dataStatus: ILLUSTRATIVE
source: Original embedded offline cards; no real observations
observedAt: null
timeBasis: SIM/T markers are fictional order, not UTC timestamps