P03-L01 · P03 · P03-M01
Explain secret exposure and recovery boundaries without entering real secrets
Prerequisites: P01-L03
Learning objectives
- Explain secret exposure and recovery boundaries without entering real secrets
- Classify public locators versus confidential recovery capability.
- Distinguish a request, disclosure statement and observed use.
EN source master · P03-L01 · needs_review
Offline/read-only study only. Never provide secrets, passwords or authentication codes. No wallet connection, real approval, live revocation, transaction signature, transfer, funds or trade. Visuals are specifications only.
Why this matters
Evidence reporting should explain a possible secret exposure without creating another exposure. Recovery capability and a public address have different security roles.
Explanation
Separate access mechanisms
A BIP-39 mnemonic and optional passphrase derive seed material [BIP39]. They are not a public account locator. A local app password protects an application-access layer; it is not the same mechanism as protocol signing capability. A password change does not establish that previously copied recovery material has lost its capability. No mnemonic, key or authentication value is provided or requested here.
Record categories, never secret values
Official security guidance rejects sharing private keys, seed phrases and passwords [SECURITY]. The course also excludes authentication codes, screenshots containing confidential material and remote access. A useful evidence note can name the requested category and preserve a sanitized request description. It should not reproduce the material whose exposure is at issue.
The fixture uses category cards. R1 is a nonsecret teaching locator. R2 describes a confidential request without supplying a value. R3 claims a local password change reverses recovery exposure. R4 is a fictional disclosure statement. Reading these cards is enough to assess what each claim requires.
Preserve the stages
Requested, provided and subsequently used are different propositions. A displayed prompt does not show compliance. A user statement does not independently prove theft. A later transaction record, even if available, would need its own network/context and could not by itself name an attacker. Keep these stages in separate evidence rows rather than compressing them into “hacked.”
Match the conclusion to the supplied evidence
OBSERVED means the card text or category within the exercise. INFERRED means the mechanism distinction under the stated model. UNKNOWN covers real disclosure, account access and losses because no such records are supplied. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE applies to claims identifying a real attacker or asserting theft from the prompt alone. This exercise rehearses reporting; it never asks the learner to demonstrate recovery, inspect an actual backup or move funds.
Key terms
- Seed material: confidential input from which a wallet scheme can derive signing keys.
- Private key: confidential signing value for an account or authorization role.
- Recovery material: confidential capability to recreate signing access.
- Public locator: nonsecret record identifier.
- Local password: application access control.
- Disclosure statement: a report of exposure, requiring its own provenance.
Historical example
ILLUSTRATIVE sanitized cards; no secrets. R1 public locator SIM-TX-1. R2 ‘Support requests recovery material’, value [NOT PROVIDED]. R3 ‘An app-password change reverses recovery-material exposure’. R4 fictional user statement ‘I provided recovery material’; no account, loss record or real timestamp supplied.
Visual specifications
Public-locator and confidential-capability lanes. R2 contains only a category and prohibited-request label. R3 is a mechanism claim, R4 a user statement. Never generate phrase words, key bytes or scannable codes.
What the evidence proves
The stipulated categories and existence of request/disclosure statements in the fixture.
What the evidence does not prove
Actual disclosure, theft, human identity, recoverability or guaranteed containment.
Common mistakes
- Uploading a secret as evidence.
- Treating a public address as signing capability.
- Assuming app-password changes withdraw copied recovery capability.
Practical exercise
Classify R1–R4 and write a sanitized incident sentence. Explain whether R2 proves compliance and whether R3 establishes containment. Identify missing evidence without requesting confidential values.
Submit a table and bounded conclusion using only supplied offline material. Editorial time allocation: study 12 min, exercise 8 min, correction/quiz 10 min.
Show worked correction
R1 is a public fixture locator. R2 establishes a requested category only. R3 confuses application access with recovery capability. R4 is a fictional user-reported statement, not independently observed theft. Actual exposure and loss remain UNKNOWN; attacker attribution is INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. A safe note states the source/category and excludes all secret values.
Rubric: exact scope, source provenance, reasoning, explicit limits and safe offline handling, one point each. Invented observations or unsupported identity attribution require correction regardless of score. Formative only.
Checklist
- Use categories only.
- Separate public identifiers and capabilities.
- Distinguish request/report/use.
- Exclude secret screenshots and codes.
- Bound loss and identity claims.
Summary
Evidence handling must preserve facts without collecting secrets. A public locator, local password and recovery capability are distinct objects.
Summary
- Explain secret exposure and recovery boundaries without entering real secrets
- Classify public locators versus confidential recovery capability.
- Distinguish a request, disclosure statement and observed use.
Next lesson
P03-L02 after prerequisite and correction review.
Tools
NONE in authoritative catalog. Provided offline data suffice; no product purchase or wallet operation required.
Sources & claim boundaries
- [BIP39] BIP-39 mnemonic seed specification — Mnemonic-to-seed derivation with optional passphrase; not fixture authentication.
- [SECURITY] Ethereum security and scam prevention — Secret confidentiality, exact-domain checks and unofficial support caution.
Documentation explains mechanisms. Historical records retain their declared source class. Source inspection is not independent editorial acceptance.
Visual specifications
P03-L01-V01
Explain secret exposure and recovery boundaries without entering real secrets
ILLUSTRATIVE sanitized offline cards, not a live screen
Public-locator and confidential-capability lanes. R2 contains only a category and prohibited-request label. R3 is a mechanism claim, R4 a user statement. Never generate phrase words, key bytes or scannable codes.
Public-locator and confidential-capability lanes. R2 contains only a category and prohibited-request label. R3 is a mechanism claim, R4 a user statement. Never generate phrase words, key bytes or scannable codes.
390px stacked cards/text equivalent; 768px/desktop render acceptance pending
RTL prose; identifiers isolated LTR; factual edge directions preserved
FIX-P03-L01
Sources & claim boundaries
BIP39 · PRIMARY_DOCUMENTATION
BIP-39 mnemonic seed specification
- Supported claim
- Mnemonic-to-seed derivation with optional passphrase; not fixture authentication.
- Verification boundary
- Primary source inspected for associated mechanism or attributed statement; no authentication of illustrative data.
- Checked at
- 2026-10-01
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki
SECURITY · PRIMARY_DOCUMENTATION
Ethereum security and scam prevention
- Supported claim
- Secret confidentiality, exact-domain checks and unofficial support caution.
- Verification boundary
- Primary source inspected for associated mechanism or attributed statement; no authentication of illustrative data.
- Checked at
- 2026-10-01
https://ethereum.org/en/security/
Dataset provenance
id: FIX-P03-L01
dataStatus: ILLUSTRATIVE
source: Original embedded offline cards; no real observations
observedAt: null
timeBasis: SIM/T markers are fictional order, not UTC timestamps